Life News learned the name of the bomber in Domodedovo
http://ruleaks.net/2119 Chechnya: Past and Future War. Part V, the final.
What should Putin?
44. Currently, Putin's policy in Chechnya through Kadyrov and Yamadayev. Putin's plenipotentiary Representative (Ambassador) in the Southern Federal District, Dmitry Kozak, has little influence. He was not even invited, when Putin delivered a speech before a new parliament in Grozny last December. Putin should stop taking direct calls Kadyrov and begin to work more through his envoy and government special services. He also needs to increase civilian cooperation with Chechnya.
45. Putin must continue to reform the army and other power ministries. Acquiring greater control over the army by Sergei Ivanov, Putin has closed for the army, some opportunities for criminal activity - but left the majority of military criminal enterprises intact. He practically did nothing to establish the discipline necessary in a modern army, which direct unstable regions such as the North Caucasus. The latest information on bullying suggests that the discipline is still equivalent to brutality and sadism. Ministry of Interior (MoI) has undergone even less reform. Chechenization Security Service, despite the obvious shortcomings, has shown that local people can cope with the security is better than the Russian troops.
46. Recently, Putin must understand that its current policy not prevent the growth of paramilitary jihadism. Conversely, whenever his subordinates are trying to extinguish the flames, the flame becomes hotter and spreads Putin needs to continue to check their fire hose, he may find that fills the flames with gasoline. He needs to develop a credible strategy use economic and cultural leverage to deal with armed jihadism. Some Russian understands this. Councilor Kozak has recently made lecture, which showed that he imagines in detail the problems arising from the growing military jihadism. Kozak himself in a recent conversation with the ambassador said, that he clearly understands the profound social and economic roots of the problems that Russia faces in the North Caucasus, and understands that their decisions not enough safety measures. But we have not noticed, that this awareness of the true challenges of the office Kozak, Rostov-on-Don, came to Moscow.
47. We should also be aware that Putin's strategy is a negative reaction in Moscow. Excesses of Ramzan Kadyrov, Putin immunity given to him by the federal authorities, and special laws that apply only to Chechnya (for example, the Chechens do not have to serve in the army in other parts of Russia) lead to the fact that some Moscow observers say that Putin has allowed Chechnya de facto secession. Putin is strong enough to withstand such criticism, but can it be done by his successor, is less clear.
Is there a role for the United States?
48. Russia does not consider the U.S. a friend in the Caucasus, and our ability to influence events through persuasion, pressure, or low care. All we can do - is to keep trying to push Russian officials at the top level to realize that their current policy promotes the growth of jihadism, which among other things threatening beopasnosti boundaries, and that Transfer of responsibility for violence and robbery with a corrupt and brutal army to corrupt and violent local power is not a long-term solution.
49. Progress with Putin or with those who come after him, will require close cooperation with our European allies. They, like Russian, tend to see the Chechen problem only with the counter-terrorist side. For example, Britain is closely linking its "dialogue Islam "with a counter-terrorist operation (in which they converge with the Russian), based on the view that there is only one type of Islamic consciousness, and he predisposed to terrorism. This supports the Russian point of view that the issue of the North Caucasus should be sent to Cart terrorism, and to find solution to this problem is mainly meant to find the best way to kill terrorists.
50. We Europeans have to put our proposals on aid for North Caucasus, in another context: "Recognizing the role of religion in the cultures of the North Caucasus, to emphasize our interest in and support for non-religious aspects of the North Caucasus society, including civil society. The latter would require higher sensitivity, because the Russian and local authorities believe that the U.S. is using the civilian society in order to provoke the "orange revolution" and anti-Russian regimes. There is a danger that our partners are working with civil society may be those whom Churchill called "inopportune missionary, who, despite good intentions, can stop a big deal. It should not happen.
51. In our interest to understand the context of what is happening and to emphasize the positive. We can not expect a positive reaction from the Russian, if we limit our statements condemning Kadyrov, the butcher how he would have been neither. We must find areas where we can cooperate with Russian in order to ensure effective assistance to Chechnya. At the same time, we must be careful that our assistance does not look like support for the Kremlin or local government that violates rights rights. We should also avoid the point of view, which supports the assertion of the Kremlin that Chechnya is no longer a humanitarian crisis, and that the UN and its financial Donors should end aid Chechnya, increasing technical and reconstruction assistance. We and other charitable organizations must maintain a balance between humanitarian and reconstructive care.
52. Detracting from the political aspect, the hasty interruption of humanitarian assistance when the rehabilitation program has not yet deployed, will leave a vacuum that immediately benefit from the jihadists. Humanitarian organization of the European Commission, the largest source of aid, began to show signs of a hasty switch to reconstruction rather than humanitarian assistance, and we do not have this follow. Humanitarian assistance has been effective in alleviating the suffering of the Chechen refugees in Ingushetia. It was less effective in Chechnya, where Russian Government and the Kadyrov regime built temporary accommodation centers for returning refugees, but did not provide sufficient resources to provide them with tolerable living conditions. International organizations are faced with limited access to Chechnya for security reasons, but where they can act, they brought very great benefit, for example, the immunization program of the World Health Organization.
53. Resources allocated in Chechnya, often stolen. Although international aid is performing better than in Russia, and the use of funds received is more careful observation, we must realize that aid may be awarded to corrupt officials and state-supported thugs: for example, too much of the money received as a loan for the microfinance program, will be assigned to military units. Presidential Advisor Aslakhanov told us last December that Kadyrov takes his one-third of all aid. Therefore,
maintaining and controlling our humanitarian aid to Chechnya we must expand our efforts in other parts of the region, which also threatens to Jihadism: Dagestan, Kabardino-Balkaria, Ingushetia, and possibly of Karachay-Cherkessia. In these regions, we should try to distribute our care (11.5 million dollars for fiscal year 2006) among regional officials such as President Kabardino-Balkaria Kanokov, who showed that they want to hold local reform and get rid of the brutal head of security, the repressive actions that fuel jihadism.
54. We must also work closely with the Kozak (or those who will come after him) in order to strengthen its position against commanders, as well as to all our activities are perceived in Russia as transparent and not aimed at undermining Russia's influence in the troubled region. Perhaps, as is currently the Russian government took the opposite view, it can not be solved to cooperate with the sponsors, UN and international financial organizations in the long-term strategic projects in the region. For example, the Russian government has delayed for a few months of the TACIS program capacity of 20 million euro, was created with the participation of the government.
55. Interagency paper on "U.S. Policy in the North Caucasus - the way forward "indicates a number of important principles for positive engagement. We should support such programs appropriate to these principles, which are the most practical in the current and likely future conditions, and those that will be most effective to help the most vulnerable population, when federal and local authorities have no desire or ability to help, as well as programs, countering the spread of jihadism, both within Chechnya and throughout the North Caucasus. There are areas - such as health care and child health - where we offer assistance to the same with the priorities of Russia, including in ourselves and humanitarian and reconstruction components.
56. We can also provide programs that help create employment space and opportunities for their appearance: Microfinance (where applicable), credit cooperatives and small business development, exchange of students. Sponsored U.S. rates on credit cooperatives and the state budget specialties were more popular. Exchanges through a program of international volunteerism IVP and the program "Community Connections» (Community Connections) - this is a particularly effective way to show future leaders of the world that exists outside narrowly focused promotion they receive. They also generate a chain reaction of business. In addition to these programs on their currently provide an alternative to religious extremism, such assistance as Russian demonstrates that improved management and provision of services can be more effective in stabilizing the region, than trying to establish order by force.
57. Last, we must look to the future in our relations with Azerbaijan and Georgia, seeking to become more active and effective participants in curbing instability in the North Caucasus. It will also serve as their own security interests. Salafis are needed due to their worldwide network. Therefore, strengthening border controls are now more important than ever. Azerbaijan in particular, is conveniently located to trade with Dagestan and Chechnya. Ethnic Azeris, Lezgins and Avars, who live on both sides of the Azerbaijani-Dagestani border, and the friendly relations between Russia and Azerbaijan - are tools for achieving stability.
Conclusions
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58. Situation in the North Caucasus has a tendency to instability, despite the increased security in Chechnya. In our opinion, Putin is scheduled to take steps that would have paid this trend. The actions that we have identified for themselves, based on the desire to promote long-term stabilization, building on improved corporate governance, more active civil society and the steps toward democratization. But we need to look realistically at the desire and the possibilities for Russia to take the necessary steps, with our help or without it. This stabilization is unlikely. Policy in Chechnya is likely to sink into a swamp of corruption, and the Kremlin politicians fight for power and succession. " Much more likely that there will come a new phase of instability that will be felt throughout the North Caucasus, and will have consequences beyond its borders.
BURNS.
Original
http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2006/05/06MOSCOW5645.html
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